The purpose of this paper is to examine whether female earnings have influenced divorce rates in Australia, using state-level data for the past four decades. Following a recent study by Ressler and Waters (2000) , which concludes from comparable US data that female earnings and divorce rates may be jointly endogenous, initial testing is performed to identify whether female earnings can be treated as exogenous. A Hausman specification error test finds no evidence of a simultaneous relationship in the Australian data, in contrast to the findings of Ressler and Waters. The test result supports the hypothesis that other underlying factors affect female earnings, of which higher divorce rates are merely another symptom. A divorce rate equation is estimated. In accordance with much of the literature, the rise in female earnings over the past four decades is found to have increased Australian divorce rates. 2
Introduction
Marriage has long been a revered social institution. Often portrayed as the embodiment of commitment and devotion, it lays a foundation for lasting companionship and the rearing of children. Of the many aspects that generate the cherished notion of "family", few tend to be more important than marriage. Despite these traditional sentiments, the sanctity of marriage has been challenged in the past few decades, as the number of people marrying has stagnated and divorce rates have There are common causal factors for changes in trends to marry and divorce.
However, the rise in marriage breakdown has typically attracted more focus because of the greater problems it is perceived to create. Depression and other psychiatric problems, social withdrawal, child abuse, and drug use have all been mooted as consequences of family failure (Pell 2001, p15) .
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Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics, Marriages and Divorces, Canberra, 1995; Given these issues, it is not surprising that divorce has come to the attention of an economic profession increasingly ambitious to apply economic theory to explain behaviour outside the monetary market sector. During the past three decades, much empirical literature has emerged testing and refining Becker's (1973) seminal paper propounding a theory of marriage consistent with other decision-making methodology. By assuming various characteristics of the marriage 'market', Becker derives several conclusions about 'gains from marriage'. Such gains arise from the division of labour between the husband and wife in market and non-market work, and 'marriage' capital. Specialisation gains result in part from the male-female wage differential. 'Marriage' capital, or non-transferable commodities produced in a household, similarly enlarges these gains.
Becker, Landes and Michael (1977) extend this theory and test its pertinence using 1967 US census data. Rising female wages are found to increase the probability of divorce. Many subsequent studies, including Smith (1997) , also find that higher women earnings were positively related to divorce rates. By concluding that state population densities affect divorce rates among 'farm' marriages, Sander (1985) infers that the divorce rate is significantly and substantially affected by the earning capacity of women in the marketplace. Lower population densities are thought to imply greater isolation for farm families and hence reduce the ability of 'farm' wives to reach working premises. The literature does not entirely support economic explanations of divorce, however. Hoffman and Duncan (1995) conclude that divorce rates are driven by changes in behaviour rather than economic factors. Analysing first marriages begun in the US between 1967 and 1983, the authors find male incomes, wages and welfare payments largely irrelevant to marital instability.
A continuing issue of concern has been the possible endogeneity of various factors modelled in divorce equations. Johnson and Skinner (1986) test whether the labour supply of married women and the future probability of divorce are jointly determined by using a simultaneous equations model on 1972 data. They find that married women expecting divorce do indeed increase their labour market participation, but that higher participation in the job market itself does not affect the probability of divorce.
Using state-level U.S. Census data, collected at four different census times, Ressler and Waters (2000) adopt a simultaneous equations model with the divorce rate and female earnings as the jointly determined variables. Apart from divorce rates being influenced by higher female wages, the authors hypothesise that greater female earnings may be partly attributable to higher divorce rates. Ressler and Waters find that simultaneity does exist between divorce rates and female wages rates. From this result they infer that previous studies of divorce rates may suffer from simultaneity bias, overstating the positive impact of female earnings on divorce.
To our knowledge, the relationship between divorce rates and female earnings has yet to be explicitly investigated using Australian data. This paper adds to the literature by exploring possible links in Australian state-level data. We seek to determine whether growing female earnings have contributed to the rise in divorce evident in Figure 1 . To do so, we evaluate whether female earnings are endogenous, hence testing the robustness of the findings of Ressler and Waters. We find that female earnings do appear to have influenced Australian divorce rates, but there is no evidence to suggest female earnings and divorce rates are jointly determined.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, models of the aggregate divorce rate and of average female earnings are devised. Section 3 contains a discussion of the econometric issues that arise and how these are addressed. Results from empirical tests and regressions are reported and analysed in Section 4. Some concluding remarks are provided in Section 5.
The Model and Data
Models of divorce rates and female earnings are developed in this section. The main focus is on estimation of an equation to explain divorce rates. A model for female earnings is constructed to test for simultaneity between divorce rates and female earnings and to provide suitable exogenous variables as instruments for this test. The two models are discussed in subsections 2.1 and 2.2, respectively. Each section contains details of the variables, and the data used to construct them; a comprehensive listing of data sources appears in the Appendix.
A model of divorce
According to Becker, Landes and Michael (1977) , divorce is optimal when the sum of the values of post-divorce opportunities, including the option value of remarriage, net of divorce costs, exceeds the joint value of the current marriage. This rule requires that utility be transferable within the marriage. With costless bargaining, the gains to marriage can be redistributed in such a way that divorce only occurs when the joint benefits exceed the joint costs (Peters 1992 p437) . In the notation of Weiss (1996 p112), divorce becomes optimal when: In this paper we hypothesize that state-wide divorce rates can be expressed as:
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A discussion of each of these variables and the data used follows. Data were compiled for each state in each of the five-yearly census years from 1961 to 1996, making a total of 48 observations.
Ideally, the dependent variable would measure the number of divorce actions initiated in each census year. The only data available -the annual number of decrees absolute issued -is subject to inertia in delays in judicial and institutional processing (Smith 1997 p536 Advantages accrue from a sexual division of labour within the marriage when male and female wage rates differ. A large relative male rate of pay encourages husbands to specialise in the market sector, with their wives specialising in household production. REL-EARN endeavours to capture specialisation gains by measuring the relative weekly earnings of full-time, non-managerial females to males. With exception of the years 1961 and 1966, when only total earnings were available, the earnings exclude overtime pay, to avoid any distortion being generated from males working longer hours. Higher relative earnings will erode gains from the sexual division of labour, implying that the value of the marriage declines. A positive sign is predicted on the coefficient of REL-EARN. It has experienced a similar rise to FEM-EARN from 1961, apart from the decline that occurred in 1996. These features are shown in Table 1 .
Empirical research suggests that people of different racial origin have varying propensities to divorce. Kidd (1995) and Sweezy and Tiefenthaler (1996) observe lower divorce hazard rates for people of Asian descent relative to other racial groups. Sweezy and Tiefenthaler (1996) find Asian women are more than twice as likely not to experience a divorce as white women. ASIAN is included to accommodate these differences. It is the proportion of the state population born in the Asian region, and is expected to negatively affect the divorce rate. ASIAN rises steadily over the years from 1961 to 1996, as indicated in Table 1 .
CATHOLIC is the proportion of the state population nominated as Catholic, including Roman Catholic. Faced with a disapproving religion, Catholics may face higher personal costs from divorce. Yet not all people designated as Catholics stringently follow its doctrine. CATHOLIC counts all people professing to be Catholic, although it would ideally include only those who are devout. Nevertheless, CATHOLIC is still a useful measure and should have a negative coefficient. Its mean has remained near 24% throughout the relevant period, as reported in Table 1, but there are state differences in the percentage.
Male unemployment unanticipated at the time of marriage causes a negative shock to the value of the married state (Becker, et al., 1977 . MALE-UN is the male unemployment rate at the time of each census. It is expected to have a positive influence on the divorce rate. As shown in Table 1 , MALE-UN remained relatively low until 1976, rising steeply to a peak in 1991 before declining somewhat in 1996.
Marital-specific commodities are those assets whose value diminishes outside the marriage. The most cited example is young children. The economic theory predicts that couples with children have greater marital gains than their childless counterparts. A suitable regressor would therefore measure the percentage of marriages in each Australian state that contain a child from that union. Alterations to ABS measurements from 1961 to 1996 make this impossible to obtain. Instead, NUPBIRTHS is used as a very crude proxy. NUPBIRTHS is derived by summing the annual tally of nuptial births registered in each state over a period of four years, concluding with the census year. This aggregate is then averaged over the married population. At any census date, and assuming children remain in their state of birth, NUPBIRTHS is the number of nuptially-born children aged four or under per married person. It is expected to have a negative influence on DIVRATE. As illustrated in Table 1 , the mean of NUPBIRTHS has steadily declined over the sample period.
There are some problems with the variable NUPBIRTHS that deserve more acknowledgment. Firstly, the distribution of young children across marriages is disregarded. A state recording a higher NUPBIRTHS value may actually have fewer marriages containing children, if those children are concentrated in a smaller number of marriages. If Becker's (1977) hypothesis that the first two children discourage marriage more than additional children is accepted, then nuptial births that occur in marriages already containing children should not be weighted as heavily as first-child births. Secondly, NUPBIRTHS will include children conceived outside the marriage, but whose parents subsequently married following knowledge of the pregnancy.
Accidental premarital conception increases the probability of dissolution because it raises the search cost of finding a suitable mate (Becker, et al., 1977 .
Therefore, unmarried prospective parents are more likely to accept marriage offers of lower value. This aspect will mitigate the anticipated negative relationship between DIVRATE and NUPBIRTHS.
Following the work of Sander (1985) , RURAL is the proportion of the population living outside urban centres with 1000 people or more, as defined by the ABS. It proxies for the number of "farm" marriages in each state, a variable whose relevance stems from Sander's hypothesis that farm marriages were less likely to end in dissolution. Married women dwelling outside urban centres have limited exposure to market work, thereby reducing opportunities outside marriage. Couples in rural areas are also likely to exploit the gains from specialisation within marriage to a greater degree. For these reasons, it is anticipated that RURAL will have a negative impact on DIVRATE. However, this negative impact may decline as the number of people living in rural areas increases, as this may actually present greater opportunities outside the marriage for 'country' wives. RURAL is expected to have a negative but diminishing effect on the divorce rate. This effect can be captured by including linear and reciprocal terms, with both expected to have positive coefficients.
From Table 1 we see that the RURAL average declined from 1961-76, thereafter increasing except for a small decline in 1996.
Welfare payments may encourage divorce by improving post-divorce opportunities. The Commonwealth Government assumed responsibility for the pension scheme for divorced women and their dependent children in June 1942.
Although nominal payments spanning the desired period are therefore identical across states, payments in real terms and with regard to opportunity costs are dissimilar.
Disparities arise in real values because of the unique CPI movements in each state.
The value of pensions must also be assessed in a context mindful of the husband income they are likely to replace. The pension scheme considered is the maximum weekly payment to divorced and unemployed mothers with one child under five.
WELFARE is this pension payment in real terms, as a percentage of the average "ordinary time" income of full-time adult non-managerial males in each state. It is expected to positively influence DIVRATE. The WELFARE mean jumped sharply upwards after 1961, but from then on fluctuated between 31% and 39%, as indicated in Table 1 .
State-specific cultural climates can be important determinant of regional propensities to divorce. Ressler and Waters (2000) find that a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for deeply religious states and 0 otherwise is significant in their model.
Queensland is more conservative than other Australian states, which may lead it to have lower divorce rates than elsewhere. QLD is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the state is Queensland and 0 otherwise. Table 2 is expected to have contributed positively to the rise in FEM-EARN.
FEMALE-UN is the unemployment rate of the female workforce at the time of each census. A high unemployment rate could reflect an excess supply of labour, which would decrease FEM-EARN. As shown in Table 2 , FEM-UN remained steady until 1971, increased through to 1986, and then declined gradually.
Because women who give birth must withdraw from the workforce, childbirth is viewed as sacrificial in terms of income. FERTILITY is the number of births in the census year divided by the female population of that state. As demonstrated in Table   2 , the mean of FERTILITY has declined strongly over the sample period.
Greater access to employment opportunities increases earning potential. METRO is the proportion of the state female population living in settlements containing a population of greater than 100 000, accordingly to ABS definitions. After an increase in 1961, the mean of METRO stabilised at around 58-59%, as shown in Table 2 . METRO should have a positive influence on FEM-EARN. Classifications for occupational groups changed twice in the period under scrutiny, with different occupational groups used in Census publications from 1961-1981, 1986-91 and 1996 . The procedure for creating a coherent set of data is described in the Appendix.
Econometric Issues
The data set is a pooled one containing observations on 6 states from 8 censuses. This pooled nature of the data raises questions about choice of a model specification and statistical assumptions to accommodate the different time series and cross-sectional components. For some of the possible alternatives, see Griffiths et al (1993) . The one adopted is that described by Maddala (1992 p395 
Results
The first result examined was that for the Hausman specification test. The t-value on the variable ~FEM-EARN was -0.0072, with a corresponding p-value of 0.99. Thus, there is no evidence to suggest that FEM-EARN is endogenous. This finding of no simultaneity is incongruent with the results of Ressler and Waters (2000) . Given that Regression 3 continues with the reduced number of intercepts and also excludes the variables ASIAN and WELFARE. In addition to the coefficient estimates, the Table   contains the adjusted   2 R 's, the F-values for testing the null hypothesis that all slope coefficients are zero, Jarque-Bera values for testing normality of the errors, and the results from Ramsey RESET tests, testing for model misspecification by the addition of fitted squared predictions. These statistics show, respectively, the equations fit the data well, the null hypothesis of zero slope coefficients is rejected, there is no evidence against normality of the errors, and no obvious model misspecification.
In Regression 1 a relatively large number of coefficients is being estimated with a relatively small number of observations. Also, many variables will suffer from some degree of multicollinearity; NUPBIRTHS and FEM-EARN are examples. Thus, efficient estimation is difficult and this fact is reflected by small t-ratios on several of the coefficients. Two steps were undertaken to improve the efficiency of estimates by reducing the number of variables to be estimated. These two steps led to Regressions Similarly, the null hypothesis of the 1981, 1986, 1991 and 1996 coefficients being identical could not be rejected. In that case, the F-statistic was 0.95. These tests suggest that different intercepts exist for three time periods only: 1961-1971, 1976, and 1981-1996 . This result is fitting, given 'no-fault' divorce was introduced 1961-71, 1976 and 1981-96 periods, it appears that liberalising divorce procedures caused a positive shock to the divorce rate. Smith (1997) observed similar outcomes in Britain, and hypothesised they were due to a clearance of long-dead marriages. The failure of the post-1976 intercept term to return to its earlier level indicates the new legislation has also had a long-run positive impact on divorce rates. Hence, the results support claims that the era of no-fault divorce has seen a new plateau in the incidence of divorce become established in Australia (Carmichael, et al, 1996 p4 Peters (1992) , and Sweezy and Tiefenthaler (1996) both detail a negative but insignificant influence of welfare-type measures on divorce rates.
Hoffman and Duncan (1995) find they have a positive but insignificant impact.
Curiously, Ressler and Waters (2000) find that growing welfare payments had a negative and significant effect on divorce rates over the past four decades. Our results for WELFARE join most of these reports in inferring that welfare payments have had only a weak influence on marital instability.
In Regression 3, the coefficients of CATHOLIC and QLD remain insignificant, but they are retained because they have the anticipated signs and omitting them will lead to a reduction in the adjusted 2 R . It is difficult to assess 'religiosity' by simply measuring the percentage of Catholics in a state. When modelling divorce hazard rates, Johnson and Skinner (1986) found an irregular affect from a 'Catholic' variable, although a 'frequent religious attendance' variable had a negative and significant impact. The mild evidence that QLD has a negative impact on divorce rates could be attributed to 'conservatism', but it also could be attributed to the fact that Queensland has an older population. A recurring finding in the literature is of higher relative divorce rates among those who marry at a young age. The higher probability of failure is attributed to each partner having inferior information concerning their spouse and their own needs. The information deficiency typically leads to 'young' marriages containing partners of less compatibility than marriages of older men and women. The variable QLD could be picking up this effect because of Queensland's older age profile.
Although FEM-EARN consistently has a positive coefficient, it only becomes significant once the intercept terms are consolidated. Regressions 2 and 3 show that FEM-EARN has a positive and significant impact on DIVRATE. Rising female earnings appear to have contributed to the increase in divorce in Australia. These results concur with common findings in the literature.
REL-EARN has a coefficient significantly different from zero in Regressions 2
and 3, and a negative coefficient, implying that the rise in divorce has not been driven by greater sexual equality in earnings. The signs of the REL-EARN and FEM-EARN coefficients suggest that increasing independence of women in the form of higher real wages has been the major force behind marital instability. Diminishing specialisation gains from the division of labour actually appear to reduce the divorce rate, once we control for the presence of young children through the variable NUPBIRTHS.
NUPBIRTHS has a significant coefficient of expected sign. Using the more appealing variable of "the percentage of married couples in each state with children under six", Ressler and Waters (2000) obtain exactly the same result. It appears that despite being a crude proxy, NUPBIRTHS may accurately reflect the desired variable.
Divorce rates appear to be positively influenced by the male unemployment rate,
given that MALE-UN has a significant and positive coefficient in every regression.
Studies using aggregate and micro-set data commonly find this result.
Both RURAL and (1/ ) RURAL have significant coefficients and the expected positive signs. The impact of RURAL on DIVRATE is a diminishing negative one as was hypothesized, up to the proportion 0.18 RURAL = . Thereafter it is positive. This outcome can be explained by another characteristic of rural life that may lead to higher divorce rates. People living in rural areas face higher search costs when selecting a mate; their search will therefore be briefer and they may settle for a partner that is ultimately unsuitable. As noted by Sweezy and Teifenthaler (1996) , the divorce-deterring impact of extra martial gains from rural living can be offset by the divorce-raising prospect of high search costs. 
Concluding Remarks
Several empirical studies, not all at the aggregate level, have demonstrated a statistical causal relationship linking female earnings to divorce rates. Yet the literature examining possible simultaneity of these variables is comparatively meagre. Studies are also rare for countries other than the US and the United Kingdom. Using
Australian data, in this paper we find that rising female earnings have partly contributed to the increase in divorce over the past four decades. These results join a large body of literature that is generally supportive of these findings and the economic theory. The paper also tests whether average female earnings and aggregate divorce rates are jointly endogenous, thus testing the robustness of the results of Ressler and Waters (2000) . Their theory prescribing aggregate divorce rates as determinants of female earnings can be questioned. Increases in female earnings may be driven by factors other than divorce but which impact on both. One example is the presence of children. Also, the net effects of divorce on female earnings may cancel out at the aggregate level. Testing of the theory is ultimately an empirical question. The analysis provided in this paper is restricted by the use of aggregated data and limited observations. Nevertheless, it is demonstrated that divorce rates do not necessarily affect female earnings. This supports the hypothesis that rising divorce rates have had little or no influence on the steady increase in female earnings at the aggregate level.
The finding is robust to minor model alterations; namely, whether or not state dummy variables are included when modelling female earnings.
Further research directed towards analysing relationships between such variables as fertility rates, female earnings, divorce and education within an enlarged data set is needed. In particular, an investigation using a micro data set would be appropriate. A thorough analysis of the interplay between education, children, divorce and earnings would require such highly detailed information. Of these relationships, perhaps the most illuminating would result from modelling differences in earnings between childless female divorcees and childless wives. This task is especially challenging for Australia given the lack of appropriate data at the micro level. 
